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1 For example, Zijing Mining disclosed information
CSRC’’. According to the rectiﬁcation report in Decemb
governance mechanisms, including information discl
2 For more details, see the Finance and EconomicsReceiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect ﬁnancing contracts
between a ﬁrm and its bank, as both the ﬁrm’s credit risk and information risk increase
after punishment. By focusing on Chinese ﬁrms’ borrowing behavior after events of corpo-
rate fraud, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ bank loans after punishment are not only signiﬁcantly lower,
but are also less than those for non-fraudulent ﬁrms. In addition, loan interest rates after
punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraud-
ulent counterparts. In addition, we ﬁnd that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the
‘‘performance-bank loan’’ relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively
affects a ﬁrm’s ability to source debt ﬁnancing, which provides new evidence about the
economic consequences of fraud.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This paper investigates the economic consequences of corporate fraud. This is of particular importance to investors and
other market participants because of the rise in corporate fraud in recent years. For example, the acid waste incident involv-
ing Zijin Mining in July 2010 was disclosed 10 days after the event, which meant its investors lost the opportunity to sell
their stocks in a timely fashion. Prior to this, the ﬁrm had already been investigated many times for poor information dis-
closure.1 Another example is Wuliangye Yibin, whose stock price fell by over 4% when it was held responsible by the Chinese
Security Regulatory Committee (CSRC) for three fraudulent events: non-disclosure of important investment projects and losses,
non-disclosure of important securities investment losses and data error on disclosed revenue. Some analysts, however, believe
that the three events are old news and had no real effect on Wuliangye.2 There are many instances of corporate fraud in the
Chinese capital market, but many ﬁrms have not been affected and have no incentive to correct their behavior. Hence, thisnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
served.
3.
en).
on March 30, 2010: ‘‘For violation of the information disclosure regulation, we are being investigated by
er 29, 2009, the Fujian Securities Regulatory Commission required Zijing Mining to improve its corporate
osure, ﬁnancial institutions and accounting processes, among others.
website: CSRC disclose three faults of Wulianye. www.caijing.com.cn/2009-09-24/110259630.html.
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fraud analyze the reason, mechanism and characteristics of corporate fraud (Beasley, 1996; Chen et al., 2005a,b; Dechow et al.,
1996; Johnson et al., 2009; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff et al., 2008; Zhang and Ma, 2005) and the short-termmarket reaction
(Chen et al., 2005a,b). Because of the limited reﬁnancing ability of equity and debt markets in China, previous papers were un-
able to determine the long-term economic consequences of corporate fraud. As banks are the most important source of ﬁnanc-
ing for listed companies in China, we can answer this question from the view of ﬁrms’ borrowing behavior.
Disclosure of fraud and receiving punishment from regulators3 inﬂuences the relationship between banks and ﬁrms by
affecting credit risk and information risk. These events make banks anxious about a ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows and earnings, which
affects their lending behavior to the ﬁrm. By focusing on ﬁrms who were punished for fraud in the Chinese A-share market dur-
ing the period 2000–2007, this paper investigates the effects of punishment on the size and interest rates of bank loans. The
results show that, compared with the situation before punishment, ﬁrms receive less bank loans and higher interest rates after
punishment. In addition, compared with other ﬁrms, punished ﬁrms also receive less bank loans and higher interest rates.
Moreover, corporate fraud also affects bank loans by inﬂuencing the relationship between bank loans and corporate perfor-
mance indirectly. Our results show that punishment for fraud affects a ﬁrm’s ability to acquire ﬁnancing.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it provides new evidence on the economic consequence of
corporate fraud. Previous papers have focused on the causes, characteristics and short-term market reaction rather than
the long-term economic consequences of corporate fraud. This paper, however, investigates the effect of corporate fraud
on bank loans by investigating ﬁrms’ credit and information risks, thus extending research on the economic consequences
of corporate fraud. Second, due to the restrictions on equity ﬁnancing in the Chinese capital market, bank loans are the
main ﬁnancing channel. This provides a good opportunity to examine banks’ lending behavior after corporate fraud. Third,
there is an upward trend in corporate fraud reported in recent years (Table 2). Hence, the results of this paper prove that
Chinese regulators, such as the CSRC, are not a ‘‘toothless tiger’’ as punishment of ﬁrms affects their ability to source debt
ﬁnancing.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents our research hypoth-
eses. Section 4 outlines our research design, and the empirical analysis is presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the
paper.2. Literature review
In the corporate fraud literature, researchers have focused on the characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms
of the fraud ﬁrms, and also the short-term market reaction after a ﬁrm receives punishment. Beasley (1996) ﬁnds that more
independent directors reduce the instances of corporate ﬁnancial fraud, while the existence of an audit committee has no
obvious effect. Dechow et al. (1996) ﬁnd that ﬁrms whose chairman and CEO are the same person, having no controlling
shareholders and having inside directors with shares are more likely to violate regulations. Johnson et al. (2009) use ﬁrms
punished by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1991–2005 and investigate whether manage-
rial incentives lead to fraudulent behavior. They ﬁnd that managers in these ﬁrms have more restricted stocks, which means
that managerial incentives are a major factor in committing fraud. Karpoff and Lott (1993) ﬁnd that reputation loss is greater
than the legal penalty in ﬁrms committing a crime, so in this situation the reputation mechanism is more important than the
legal mechanism. Karpoff et al. (2008) examine ﬁrms who have ﬁnancial restatement violations and ﬁnd similar results as
Karpoff and Lott (1993). However, Karpoff et al. (2005) ﬁnd that ﬁrms who violate environmental regulations receive more
legal and administrative penalties than reputation penalties.
In China, Chen et al. (2005a,b) use data during 2001–2002 to explore corporate governance and reputation mechanisms
to discourage ﬁrms from committing fraud. They ﬁnd that controlling shareholders can reduce the probability of fraud,
while reputation mechanisms do not. Zhang and Ma (2005) ﬁnd a positive relationship between corporate scandals and
a ﬁrm’s controlling shareholder type and the chairman’s shareholding, but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between scan-
dals and the number of board members, ratio of independent directors and institutional investors. Chen et al. (2006) ﬁnd
that ownership does not play an important role in corporate fraud. Wu and Gao (2002) examine how the market responds
to punishment announcements from the CSRC during the period 1999–2000, and ﬁnd that ﬁrms have a negative reaction
after the punishment announcements. Chen et al. (2005a,b) ﬁnd a similar result, and state that the CSRC is a ‘‘tiger with
teeth’’.
There is less research related to the economic consequences of corporate fraud, and the evidence is mixed. Using US
data during the period 1981–1992, Agrawal et al. (1999) ﬁnd that the disclosure of corporate fraud has no effect on exec-
utive turnover and corporate governance. Sun and Zhang (2006) ﬁnd that in ﬁrms who commit corporate fraud, only the
CEO gets punished while others get promoted after the turnover. Zhu and Wu (2009) ﬁnd that fraudulent behavior in-
creases audit fees, and the probability of non-standard opinions is more likely than before, but the level of fraud has
no effect.
In summary, the literature on corporate fraud pays more attention to the determinants, characteristics and short-term
market reaction, and there is little and mixed evidence on the long-term economic consequences of corporate fraud. Using3 Hereafter referred to as ‘‘punishment for corporate fraud’’ and ‘‘violation of corporate regulations’’.
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ishment for fraud.3. Background and hypothesis development
The last 20 years has seen the rapid development of the Chinese capital market with regulatory policies giving listed com-
panies improved access to ﬁnancing. As protection of minority investors has also received increased attention, regulators
have also been punishing fraudulent ﬁrms more severely and frequently. Regulations on corporate fraud have been improved
with the enactment of laws such as the ‘‘Security Law’’, ‘‘Stock Issuing and Trading Act’’ and ‘‘Accounting Law’’, and IPO rules
released by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Security Exchanges. Regulators in the Chinese stock market include the CSRC, the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Both the enactment and enforcement of the law increase the
cost of fraud for listed ﬁrms. However, some investors regard the regulators as a ‘‘toothless tiger’’ and their credibility is
being questioned due to many instances of corporate fraud in recent years that have heavily damaged the interests of inves-
tors. Furthermore, in academia, the effect of punishment on ﬁrms who commit corporate fraud is still under debate. Chen
et al. (2005a,b) ﬁnd that ﬁrms who commit corporate fraud encounter a signiﬁcant negative market reaction, but it is still
unclear whether the punishment entails only an insigniﬁcant administrative penalty and short-term market penalty, or
whether it inﬂuences other aspects of ﬁrms’ activities, such as ﬁnancing through bank loans.
As the Chinese stock market is not as efﬁcient as that of developed countries, stock market reactions may not be a good
indicator of the economic consequences of corporate fraud. In the Chinese capital market, ﬁrms face various restrictions on
seasoned equity offerings and right offerings, and rely heavily on bank loans. Hence, examining the effect of corporate fraud
on bank loans makes our test direct and important. For a bank, the most important consideration before contracting with a
ﬁrm is to ensure that the ﬁrm has the capability to repay its loan. To guarantee enough cash ﬂow in the future, banks are
concerned about a ﬁrm’s operating and ﬁnancial status. When the bank and the ﬁrm sign a lending contract, the bank will
pay close attention to the ﬁrm’s credit/default risk and information risk and will consider the amount and quality of the
ﬁrm’s future proﬁts and cash ﬂows.4 Credit risk mainly measures the quantity of future cash ﬂows, while information risk
mainly measures the variance of future cash ﬂows. Once a ﬁrm is punished by regulators, the risk for the bank becomes higher,
and the bank must increase its monitoring effort, which ﬁnally inﬂuences both the amount and the interest rates of loans. To
summarize, fraudulent corporate behavior increases a bank’s credit risk and information risk and, thus, destabilizes the lending
contract between the bank and the ﬁrm.
Speciﬁcally, an increase in credit risk can be generated by changing the bank’s belief, litigation responsibility and rep-
utation loss, which further inﬂuence the lending contract. First, a fraud event directly affects a ﬁrm’s future real operating
activities. As the most important creditor, the bank is concerned about a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and disclosure of a punish-
ment for corporate fraud suggests that most of the information the ﬁrm released in the past is questionable, so the bank
will probably change its judgment or belief towards the ﬁrm’s prior activities. To protect its interests, the bank may no
longer offer the ﬁrm favorable terms of lending, and may also discount the available information about the ﬁrm’s perfor-
mance. As a result, the bank may offer fewer loans and require higher interest rates. Second, most disclosure of corporate
fraud is related to illegal actions. Unlike criticism from regulators, a ﬁrm who commits corporate fraud may also face lit-
igation. This can lead to more sanctions from regulators, criticism from the public and restrictions from suppliers and cus-
tomers, which result in the deterioration of both the operating and investing environment and further inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s
future cash ﬂows. All of these will affect lending from banks. Finally, Mailath and Samuelson (2006) prove the promotion
effect of reputation in a long-term dynamic game. The lending contract is a game between a bank and a ﬁrm with stable
expectations, and reputation saves on exchange costs. Corporate fraud behavior damages the good ‘‘bank-ﬁrm’’ relation-
ship based on mutual reputation. As a result, the bank will approve fewer loans and require higher interest rates to avoid
credit risk.
Besides credit risk, corporate fraud behavior can also inﬂuence a bank’s information risk. When contracting, the bank will
consider information asymmetry. Bharath et al. (2008) ﬁnd that accounting quality can reduce information asymmetry in lend-
ing contracts.YaoandXia (2009)ﬁnd thatbanks candetermine thequalityof aﬁrm’sproﬁts.However, corporate fraudbehavior
increases the uncertainty of a ﬁrm’s information and suggests other problems, such as problemsof corporate governance, oper-
ating activities or controlling shareholder’s tunneling behavior. These make the bank more uncertain about the ﬁrm’s whole
information environment and increase information asymmetry. As a result, the bank needs to monitor the ﬁrm more strin-
gently, which increasesmonitoring costs andwill be reﬂected as increased interest rates and a reduced quantity of bank loans.
In summary, punishment for corporate fraud will change a bank’s expectations of credit risk and information risk, and will
further restrict the lending event by increasing interest rates and decreasing bank loans. These effects will not only be re-
ﬂected as the difference in bank borrowing between before and after receiving punishment for corporate fraud, but also re-
ﬂected in the comparison between fraud ﬁrms and their non-fraud counterparts. Hence, our hypotheses are as follows:4 Bharath et al. (2008) state that information risk is not the same as credit risk, as information risk originates from incompleteness and asymmetry of
information, while credit risk is the probability of the ﬁrm violating an existing contract. Credit risk inﬂuences the mean of future cash ﬂow, while information
risk inﬂuences the variance of future cash ﬂow.
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For mo
We alsAfter a ﬁrm receives punishment for fraudulent behavior, bank loans decrease
H1a For ﬁrms punished by regulators for fraudulent behavior, the increase in new loans will be less than in the pre-
punishment period
H1b Compared with non-fraudulent ﬁrms, the increase in loans will be less for fraudulent ﬁrms after receiving
punishment
H2 After a ﬁrm receives punishment for fraudulent behavior, loan interest rates increase
H2a For ﬁrms punished by regulators for fraudulent behavior, the interest rates on its loans will be higher than in the
pre-punishment period
H2b Compared with non-fraudulent ﬁrms, the interest rates on the loans of fraudulent ﬁrms will be higher after
receiving punishmentWhen signing a contract with a ﬁrm, banks consider the ﬁnancial status of the ﬁrm as one of the most important factors.
Banks will use an effective monitoring system and its lending decision depends on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial status. This results in a
stable and suitable relationship between a bank and a ﬁrm. In fact, Hu and Zhou (2006) ﬁnd an obvious positive relationship
between bank loans and a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial status. Hu and Xie (2005) ﬁnd that proﬁt factors rather than liquidity factors inﬂu-
ence short-term loans. Banks forecast future cash ﬂows based on current performance to develop a stable ‘‘bank loan-per-
formance’’ relationship. According to this, banks face both credit risk, which affects the quantity of future cash ﬂows, and
information risk, which affects the variance of future cash ﬂows. Receiving punishment destabilizes the ‘‘bank loan-perfor-
mance’’ relationship, and the bank doubts the ﬁrm’s performance and regards the punishment as a loss of reputation for the
ﬁrm. This results in a discount on future cash ﬂows, and thus will break the stable ‘‘bank loan-performance’’ relationship. In
China where corruption is not as regular as in other countries, to avoid the risk, the bank has to pay more attention to the
ﬁrm’s performance, which is often written explicitly in the lending contract. On one hand, disclosure of a punishment for
corporate fraud directly affects lending behavior. On the other hand, the punishment destabilizes the ‘‘bank loan-perfor-
mance’’ relationship and indirectly increases exchange costs. Basing on the above statements, we hypothesize that:
H3: Punishment for corporate fraud decreases ﬁrm’s positive ‘‘bank loan-performance’’ relationship and increases ﬁrm’s
negative ‘‘interest rate-performance’’ relationship.
4. Research design
4.1. Models and variable deﬁnitions
From Table 1 we can see that the number of punishments for corporate fraud increases every year, which highlights the
urgency and importance of this paper. The fraud types are classiﬁed as economic crime, illegal guarantee, illegal disclosure,
false statement, delayed information disclosure, information missing or hidden and illegal tunneling. Among these, informa-
tion missing or hidden, false statement and illegal disclosure constitute the majority of the sample (158, 142 and 110 obser-
vations). Illegal guarantee has the least number of observations (21).
In the empirical sections, we investigate two types of comparisons of corporate fraud. First, we compare the time before
and after the disclosure of punishment for corporate fraud, and then compare the bank loans received by ﬁrms punished for
fraudulent behavior with those who do not commit fraud. We use loan renewals5 and interest rates to proxy for the ﬁrm’s
lending behavior, and the research models are as follows:CLtþ1ðFFEEtþ1Þ ¼ a0 þ a1FRt þ a2ROAt þ a3GROWTHt þ a4CFOt þ a5Z  scoret þ a6LEVt þ a7SIZEt þ a8ABSDAt
þ a9DOPIt þ a10CONt þ a11SHR1t þ
X
INDþ
X
YEAR þ et ð1Þ
CLtþ1FFEEtþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1FRt þ b2FRt  ROAt þ b3ROAt þ b4GROWTHt þ b5CFOt þ b6Z  scoret þ b7LEVt þ b8SIZEt
þ b9ABSDAt þ b10DOPIt þ b11CONt þ b12SHR1t þ
X
INDþ
X
YEAR þ wt ð2ÞIn model (1), we examine the direct inﬂuence of the disclosure of corporate fraud. In model (2), we use FRROA to inves-
tigate the indirect inﬂuence of fraud. CL is the change in bank loans in year t, considering the fact that in China there exists a
‘‘Short-term loans for long-term lending’’ phenomenon6; besides CTL (all bank loans), we also use CSL (short-term bank loans).
FFEE is the interest rate, measured as ‘‘ﬁnancing expense/(short-term loans + long-term loans + bonds payable)’’.7 FR_1 is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if it is after punishment, and 0 otherwise; FR_2 is also a dummy variable that takes
a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is punished in year t, and 0 otherwise. These dummy variables are used in the ‘‘before and after the pun-
ishment’s disclosure’’ subsample and ‘‘whether or not punished in year t’’ subsample, respectively. We control for the ﬁrm’s
basic characteristics, such as performance, growth, cash ﬂows, leverage, size, accounting information quality (earnings manage-
ment and audit opinion), shareholdings of the ﬁrst largest shareholder, ownership structure, and industry and year effects (Hu
and Zhou, 2006; Jiang and Li, 2006). The deﬁnitions of the variables are presented in Table 2.bank loan changes to the corporate fraud behavior, we choose loans renewals excluding loans that ﬁrms already have (see Hu and Zhou, 2006).
re details, see Wang et al., 2009.
o use ﬁnancial fees from the cash ﬂow statement as a robustness test.
Table 1
Time and type of the fraud sample.a
Year Observation Punishment type Observation
2000 31 Economic crime 58
2001 59 Illegal guarantee 21
2002 74 Illegal disclosure 110
2003 59 False statement 142
2004 106 Delayed information disclosure 97
2005 181 Information missing or hidden 158
2006 145 Illegal tunneling 45
2007 113 Others 139
Total 768 Total 768
a This table contains the situation in which a ﬁrm receives more than one punishment in 1 year.
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Symbol Deﬁnition
Bank loan renewals CTL The difference between all bank loans in year t + 1 and year t, divided by total assets in year t
CSL The difference between short-term loans in year t + 1 and year t, divided by total assets in year t
Interest rate FFEE Financing expense divided by the sum of short-term loans, long-term loans and bonds payable in year
t + 1
Punishment for corporate fraud FR_1 Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if it is after punishment, and 0 otherwisea
FR_2 Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is punished in year t, and 0 otherwise
Performance ROA Return on total assets in year t
Growth GROWTH The ratio of the difference between the revenue in year t and year t–1 to the revenue in year t
Operating cash ﬂow CFO Operating cash ﬂow divided by total assets in year t
Financial risk Z-score We compute the Z-score using the method from Wu and Lu (2001)
Leverage LEV Leverage divided by total assets in year t
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets in year t
Earnings management ABSDA Absolute value of discretional accruals, which is computed using the performance-matched Jones
model (see Kothari et al., 2004)
Audit opinion DOPI Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm gets a non-standard opinion in year t, and 0 otherwise
Ownership CON Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is controlled by the state, and 0 otherwise
Shareholding of the largest
shareholder
SHR1 The ratio of the shareholding of the ﬁrst largest shareholder divided by all shares outstanding in year t
a In fact, the results of tests of 1 year before and after the punishment remains the same.
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Our sample comprises non-ﬁnancial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the period
2003–2007. Data was collected from the CSMAR database. Missing data substantially reduces the number of observations we
can use and the ﬁnal corporate fraud sample is 729 ﬁrm-years.8 In the ‘‘whether or not punished in year t’’ subsample, using
the matching method based on industry and size in the same year, we choose 729 observations for the non-punishment ﬁrm
sample,9 and examine their lending differences 1 year later. The former sample focuses on time-series comparison and the latter
on cross-sectional comparison.10 In a robustness test, we also use the full sample for comparison. All continuous variables are
winsorized at upper and lower 1% levels to control for outliers.5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics. The mean of LEV is 69.2%, which means that the leverage of the fraud ﬁrms is
much higher and bank loans are important for them. They should pay more attention to corporate fraud due to potentially
high credit and information risks. The mean difference between CTL and CSL is small (0.015 and 0.013, respectively),
which means that there are a few long-term loans in Chinese listed ﬁrms.
In Fig. 1, we set year t as the year that a ﬁrm receives punishment due to corporate fraud, and compare the differences in
bank loans 2 years before and 2 years after.8 If the ﬁrm is punished more than once in a year, we regard this as one observation in that year. There are 677 ﬁrms in the 729 ﬁrm-year observations; we
include the situation that ﬁrms encounter several types of punishment in 1 year, so Table 2 has 768 observations.
9 In a difference test of the two samples, the t value is 1.13, and Z value is 1.18. Both are not signiﬁcant, which means our matched sample is successful.
10 The cross-sectional comparison can reduce the errors inﬂuenced by ﬁrm’s lending strategy and not because of the fraudulent behavior.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Median Max. Min. Std.
CTL 729 0.015 0.015 0.560 0.329 0.141
CSL 729 0.013 0.009 0.383 0.298 0.120
FFEE 729 0.081 0.070 0.482 0.332 0.086
ROA 729 0.093 0.029 0.168 0.470 0.162
GROWTH 729 0.069 0.004 4.080 0.825 0.712
CFO 729 0.002 0.010 0.263 0.210 0.105
Z-score 729 0.892 0.081 3.269 8.659 2.521
LEV 729 0.692 0.621 1.990 0.087 0.404
SIZE 729 20.728 20.688 24.180 18.711 0.968
ABSDA 729 0.148 0.096 1.875 0.000 0.185
DOPI 729 0.483 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.500
CON 729 0.570 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.496
SHR1 729 0.354 0.298 0.765 0.096 0.152
-0.04
-0.02
0
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Fig. 1. Loan renewal changes before and after punishment for fraud.
160 Y. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 155–165From Fig. 1 we can see that bank loans drop from year t  2 to year t + 2. Intuitively, the consequence of corporate fraud is
obvious. In fact, bank loans start decreasing in year t  1, probably because the fraudulent behavior has been committed be-
fore year t, although the regulators punish the ﬁrm in that year (regulators such as the CSRC have a time lag between paying
attention to a fraudulent ﬁrm to informal investigation, formal investigation and releasing punishment), or a bank obtains
information on fraudulent behavior before public investors do. We must emphasize that the change in bank loans is negative
in years t + 1 and t + 2, that is, after the punishment the ﬁrm’s loans are lower than the year before and this trend is almost
entirely due to the change in short-term loans. The results in Fig. 1 indicate that corporate fraud behavior signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ences bank loans, which preliminary supports our H1a.
Next, using univariate analysis, we compare total loan renewals, short-term loan renewals and interest rates of the two
subsamples – ‘‘before and after the punishment’s disclosure’’ and ‘‘whether or not punished in year t’’. Results are shown in
Table 4. For the ﬁrst subsample, compared with the year before punishment disclosure, the mean CTL and CSL is less in the
year after the disclosure of the punishment, and the interest rate increases. The median results are the same (signiﬁcant at
the 1% level). The tests in Table 4 suggest that corporate fraud reduces a ﬁrm’s bank loans and increases its interest rate.
Therefore, H1a and H2a are supported. Similar results are found for the subsample ‘‘whether or not punished in year t’’,
and H1b and H2b are supported.5.2. Regression analysis
We ﬁrst examine the subsample ‘‘before and after the punishment’s disclosure’’, and the regression results are shown in
Table 5. The relationship between FR_1 and CTL/CSL are signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, and these results hold after
controlling for economic and accounting quality factors. These results show that after the ﬁrm’s punishment disclosure,
there is a decline in loans, which supports H1a. From the interest rate perspective, the relationships between FR_1 and FFEE
are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, and these results also hold after controlling for economic and accounting quality
factors. Hence, H2a is also supported.
We also ﬁnd that ROA is positively related to CTL/STL and negatively related to FFEE, and all are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
This suggests that the bank changes the loans based on the ﬁrm’s performance. However, the stable ‘‘bank loan-perfor-
mance’’ relationship can be inﬂuenced by punishment for a ﬁrm’s fraudulent behavior, and this can be seen in Models 3,
6 and 9: the FR and ROA interaction term is signiﬁcantly negative (Model 6), and the FR and FFEE interaction term is signif-
icantly positive (Model 9). In short, H3 is supported.
Second, we examine the subsample ‘‘whether or not punished in year t’’, and the results are shown in Table 6. Consistent
with Table 5, the coefﬁcient on FR_2 is negative at the 1% level with CTL and CSL, but predominantly insigniﬁcant with FFEE.
Table 4
Univariate analysis.
Variable Before and after the punishment Whether or not punished
FR_1 = 0 FR_1 = 1 FR_2 = 0 FR_2 = 1
Observation 1163 1252 729 729
Panel A: CTL
Mean 0.0273 0.019 0.0283 0.032
Diff (1–0) 0.0463 0.0603
T value 8.41*** 8.27***
Median 0.0099 0.0114 0.0059 0.0151
Diff (1–0) 0.0213 0.021
Z value 9.42*** 8.35***
Panel B: CSL
Mean 0.0287 0.027 0.0176 0.039
Diff (1–0) 0.0557 0.0566
T value 11.91*** 9.41***
Median 0.0126 0.01 0.0071 0.0114
Diff (1–0) 0.0226 0.0185
Z value 11.92*** 9.49***
Panel D: FFEE
Mean 0.0569 0.0827 0.0729 0.0876
Diff (1–0) 0.0258 0.0147
T value 6.99** 2.57**
Median 0.0576 0.071 0.0572 0.0716
Diff (1–0) 0.0134 0.0144
Z value 10.18*** 6.02***
⁄ Denote p < 0.10.
** Denote p < 0.05.
*** Denote p < 0.01.
Table 5
Results of ‘‘Before and After the Punishment’’ subsample.
CTL CSL FFEE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
FR_1 0.044*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.054*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.013***
(7.91) (3.32) (3.57) (11.45) (6.57) (6.83) (6.94) (2.7) (3.29)
FR_1ROA 0.061 0.067* 0.083***
(1.45) (1.87) (2.84)
ROA 0.088*** 0.133*** 0.068*** 0.117*** 0.048*** 0.108***
(3.56) (3.35) (3.23) (3.48) (2.69) (3.90)
GROWTH 0.010⁄⁄ 0.010** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.005* 0.005*
(2.33) (2.35) (3.44) (3.47) (1.84) (1.85)
CFO 0.05 0.052* 0.062** 0.064** 0.107*** 0.110***
(1.63) (1.70) (2.40) (2.48) (4.95) (5.06)
Z-score 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.70) (0.68) (0.70) (0.67) (0.93) (0.91)
LEV 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(5.73) (5.73) (5.60) (5.59) (5.25) (5.23)
SIZE 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.003 0.003
(6.41) (6.35) (5.2) (5.13) (1.21) (1.14)
ABSDA 0.032** 0.032** 0.004 0.004 0.014 0.013
(2.25) (2.25) (0.32) (0.32) (1.21) (1.1)
DOPI 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(3.71) (3.60) (4.16) (4.03) (3.06) (2.92)
CON 0.012* 0.006 0.005 0.011** 0.003 0.003 0.009** 0.001 0.001
(1.91) (0.91) (0.83) (2.14) (0.59) (0.50) (2.05) (0.13) (0.25)
SHR1 0.078*** 0.036⁄ 0.036⁄ 0.056*** 0.023 0.022 0.001 0.014 0.014
(4.02) (1.96) (1.93) (3.41) (1.45) (1.42) (0.09) (1.07) (1.07)
Constant 0.009 0.391*** 0.387*** 0.001 0.251*** 0.246*** 0.063*** 0.083* 0.079
(1.20) (5.72) (5.65) (0.1) (4.33) (4.24) (12.11) (1.71) (1.63)
Year&IND
p p p p p p p p p
R2 0.04 0.142 0.142 0.065 0.162 0.164 0.024 0.079 0.083
F-value 33.61 35.44 32.68 55.81 41.67 38.53 18.04 16.9 16.21
Obs. 2415 2415 2415 2415 2415 2415 2415 2415 2415
Notes: t values in brackets. The VIF coefﬁcient is less than 10.
* Denote p < 0.10.
** Denote p < 0.05.
*** Denote p < 0.01.
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Table 6
Results of ‘‘Whether or Not Punished’’ sample.
CTL CSL FFEE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
FR_2 0.057*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.052*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.001 0.003
(7.80) (2.87) (3.19) (8.82) (3.70) (4.06) (2.67) (0.17) (0.44)
FR_2ROA 0.183*** 0.167*** 0.260***
(3.23) (3.60) (5.52)
ROA 0.080** 0.219*** 0.041 0.168*** 0.064** 0.257***
(2.40) (4.03) (1.49) (3.76) (2.27) (5.74)
GROWTH 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.008** 0.008* 0.002 0.001
(3.35) (3.25) (1.99) (1.87) (0.59) (0.35)
CFO 0.115*** 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.085*** 0.083** 0.060*
(3.05) (2.79) (3.05) (2.76) (2.57) (1.86)
Z-score 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.60) (0.75) (0.39) (0.22) (0.07) (0.19)
LEV 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.005 0.001
(7.56) (7.79) (7.19) (7.46) (0.44) (0.06)
SIZE 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.012***
(7.33) (7.18) (5.50) (5.34) (3.99) (3.62)
ABSDA 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.034** 0.039** 0.032** 0.023
(3.59) (3.87) (2.25) (2.57) (2.07) (1.51)
DOPI 0.006 0.007 0.014* 0.015* 0.028*** 0.029***
(0.65) (0.72) (1.72) (1.81) (3.43) (3.58)
CON 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.022*** 0.015**
(0.57) (1.23) (0.69) (0.52) (1.31) (0.71) (1.57) (3.39) (2.34)
SHR1 0.074*** 0.006 0.002 0.075*** 0.025 0.020 0.017 0.005 0.011
(2.80) (0.25) (0.07) (3.52) (1.23) (1.02) (0.84) (0.24) (0.57)
Constant 0.038 0.587*** 0.572*** 0.052* 0.373*** 0.359*** 0.088*** 0.363*** 0.333***
(1.04) (6.68) (6.52) (1.74) (5.17) (5.00) (3.24) (4.85) (4.48)
Year and IND
p p p p p p p p p
R2 0.105 0.270 0.276 0.125 0.271 0.278 0.064 0.125 0.147
F-value 7.76 17.33 17.21 9.39 17.43 17.43 4.00 6.01 6.97
Obs. 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458
Notes: t values in brackets. The VIF coefﬁcient is less than 10.
* Denote p < 0.10.
** Denote p < 0.05.
*** Denote p < 0.01.
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only directly inﬂuences bank loans and interest rates, but also indirectly inﬂuences the ‘‘bank loan-performance’’ and ‘‘inter-
est rate-performance’’ relationships. These results support H1b, H2b and H3.5.3. Robustness tests
Considering that different ﬁrms have different borrowing strategies, we use dummy variables to measure bank loan
renewals (Hu and Zhou, 2006); that is, when CTL/CSL is positive, then DCTL/DCSL is 1, and 0 otherwise. The results of the
logistic model are shown in Table 7. Similar to the OLS results, for both the subsample ‘‘before and after the punishment’s
disclosure’’ and the subsample ‘‘whether or not punished in year t’’, the coefﬁcients on FR and FRROA are all negative at the
1% or 5% levels (except DCTL). Hence, all three hypotheses are further supported.
In addition, although a ﬁrm receives punishment in year t, its fraudulent behavior may be disclosed before that year, or
the bank is more informed than the public. To control for this effect, we allocate the fraud year into the ‘‘after fraud’’ sample,
and the results are shown in Table 8. FFEE and FR are signiﬁcantly positively related, and CTL/CSL and FR are signiﬁcantly
negatively related. At the same time, to reduce errors when using the matching sample method, we add all non-fraud obser-
vations, and the results remain the same.
Meantime, we have also completed the following robustness tests (to be succinct, we do not present our results):
(1) In the subsample ‘‘before and after the punishment’s disclosure’’, we only consider 1 year before and after the punish-
ment’s disclosure. As in the ‘‘bank-ﬁrm’’ lending relationship, ﬁnancial information is more important than other fac-
tors for the bank, so we also select the observations suffering ﬁnancial fraud. Because banks may decide their lending
behavior based on ﬁnancial information, such as cash ﬂow, growth, operating risk, ﬁnancial information quality and
leverage, we use comprehensive analysis to synthesize ROA, GROWTH, CFO, Z-score, Lev, SIZE, ABSDA and DOPI to a
comprehensive variable.
Table 7
Robustness test I.
Before and after the punishment Whether or not punished
DCTL DCSL DCTL DCSL
FR 0.105*** 0.154*** 0.115*** 0.170***
(4.61) (6.75) (4.19) (6.22)
FR⁄ROA 0.487*** 0.568*** 0.312 0.428**
(3.19) (3.73) (1.48) (2.03)
ROA 0.684*** 0.696*** 0.812*** 0.774***
(4.7) (4.79) (4.02) (3.84)
GROWTH 0.004 0.018 0.001 0.014
(0.27) (1.19) (0.05) (0.74)
CFO 0.042 0.091 0.455*** 0.506***
(0.38) (0.83) (3.24) (3.61)
Z-score 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.037*** 0.030***
(3.27) (2.78) (3.87) (3.11)
LEV 0.05 0.022 0.168*** 0.103**
(1.40) (0.61) (3.54) (2.18)
SIZE 0.094*** 0.084*** 0.119*** 0.100***
(7.74) (6.91) (8.04) (6.78)
ABSDA 0.012 0.003 0.027 0.150**
(0.23) (0.06) (0.39) (2.19)
DOPI 0.119*** 0.140*** 0.042 0.091**
(4.89) (5.73) (1.14) (2.49)
CON 0.061*** 0.031 0.049* 0.037
(2.72) (1.38) (1.70) (1.28)
SHR1 0.299*** 0.139** 0.086 0.054
(4.34) (2.03) (0.95) (0.6)
Constant 1.839*** 1.331*** 1.822*** 1.478***
(6.51) (4.70) (5.59) (4.53)
Year and IND
p p p p
R2 0.17 0.169 0.201 0.201
F-value 16.05 15.95 11.4 11.39
Obs. 2415 2415 1458 1458
Notes: t values in brackets. The VIF coefﬁcient is less than 10.
* Denote p < 0.10.
** Denote p < 0.05.
*** Denote p < 0.01.
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we delete observations where the interval between committing fraud and punishment is longer than 1 year. In addi-
tion, we add an interval variable to control for this effect in the OLS model.
(3) We also use ‘‘cash outﬂow for ﬁnancing expense’’ in the cash ﬂow statement to proxy for interest costs, as this variable
is different from ﬁnancing expense in the income statement and does not include items such as exchange gains and
losses.
The results remain the same for these robustness tests, which means our results are robust.116. Conclusions
Corporate fraud signiﬁcantly damages the interests of investors and punishment from regulators plays an important role
in investor protection. However, does punishment for fraud have a negative effect on ﬁrms? This question is important not
only to determine whether regulators are a ‘‘toothless tiger’’ or not, but also to protect investors and to promote the healthy
development of capital markets. However, academic research has failed to form a consensus on this issue.
In contrast to the existing research, which mainly discuss the reasons and short-term market reaction to corporate fraud,
this paper takes punished ﬁrms for corporate fraud as its research subject and focuses on changes in bank loans to investi-
gate the economic consequence of corporate fraud. We believe that punishment for corporate fraud inﬂuences the contrac-
tual relationship between banks and ﬁrms, and affects the credit risk and information risk of bank loans. As a result, banks
will be anxious about a ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows and earnings stability and, hence, will reduce the loans it will lend to the
ﬁrm. Our empirical evidence shows that punishment for fraud reduces the amount of bank loans and increases the interest
rate. Compared with non-fraudulent ﬁrms, fraudulent companies have lower bank loan renewals and higher interest rates.
Moreover, corporate fraud inﬂuences bank loan policy by affecting the relationship between bank loans and performance.11 We thank the anonymous referee for these suggestions.
Table 8
Robustness test II.
Before and after the punishment Whether or not punished
CTL CSL FFEE CTL CSL FFEE
FR 0.011** 0.021*** 0.008** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.014***
(2.02) (4.48) (2.07) (3.43) (5.51) (3.60)
FRROA 0.033 0.049 0.051* 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.170***
(0.83) (1.45) (1.85) (3.25) (3.74) (7.41)
ROA 0.106*** 0.092*** 0.082*** 0.195*** 0.142*** 0.112***
(2.69) (2.77) (3.00) (9.78) (9.13) (7.53)
GROWTH 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.002
(2.81) (4.11) (2.66) (3.73) (4.87) (1.60)
CFO 0.030 0.046** 0.066*** 0.143*** 0.098*** 0.013
(1.14) (2.06) (3.53) (8.65) (7.63) (1.03)
Z-score 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.001
(1.04) (1.25) (1.38) (4.67) (2.68) (0.65)
LEV 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.008 0.088*** 0.067*** 0.054***
(5.17) (5.55) (1.37) (14.19) (13.88) (11.57)
SIZE 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.008***
(7.11) (6.02) (2.65) (18.43) (13.32) (7.79)
ABSDA 0.013 0.007 0.025** 0.066*** 0.036*** 0.003
(0.95) (0.59) (2.45) (11.05) (7.63) (0.74)
DOPI 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.004
(4.94) (5.53) (4.41) (4.54) (4.98) (1.33)
CON 0.012** 0.009** 0.002 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.004*
(2.22) (1.97) (0.51) (3.04) (2.85) (1.78)
SHR1 0.040** 0.025* 0.001 0.016** 0.011* 0.007
(2.37) (1.75) (0.09) (1.99) (1.75) (1.14)
Constant 0.533*** 0.382*** 0.181*** 0.465*** 0.256*** 0.221***
(7.67) (6.50) (3.73) (15.43) (10.88) (9.87)
Year and IND
p p p p p p
R2 0.166 0.188 0.104 0.141 0.130 0.085
F-value 19.93 23.11 10.67 55.78 50.63 29.02
Obs. 3144 3144 3144 10223 10223 10223
Notes: t values in brackets. The VIF coefﬁcient is less than 10.
* Denote p < 0.10.
** Denote p < 0.05.
*** Denote p < 0.01.
164 Y. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 155–165These results imply that punishment from regulators indeed has a negative economic impact on the subsequent bank loans
of fraudulent ﬁrms.
The ﬁndings of this paper warn listed ﬁrms of the consequences of fraudulent behavior. We advise regulators to widen the
range of punishments, and appeal to the media, investors and market participants to provide stronger supervision and apply
more pressure on fraudulent ﬁrms.Acknowledgements
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